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For Keren,
who has always opposed
the probabilistic method
“I don’t understand you,” said Alice. “It’s dreadfully confus-
ing!”
“That’s the effect of living backwards,” the Queen said kindly:
“it always makes one a little giddy at first—”
“Living backwards!” Alice repeated in great astonishment. “I
never heard of such a thing!”
“–but there’s one great advantage in it, that one’s memory
works both ways.”
“I’m sure mine only works one way,” Alice remarked. “I can’t
remember things before they happen.”
“It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards,” the
Queen remarked.
[Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass]
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Abstract
We suggest solving the measurement problem by postulating the existence of
a special future final boundary condition for the universe. Although this is an
extension of the way boundary conditions are usually chosen (in terrestrial
laboratories), it is our only deviation from standard quantum mechanics.
Using two state vectors, or the “two-state”, to describe completely the state
of systems of interest, we analyze ideal and “weak” measurements, and show
the consistency of our scheme. If the final state of a measuring device is
assigned to be one of the possible outcomes of the measurement, an effective
reduction is observed after an ideal measurement process. For final condi-
tions chosen with an appropriate distribution, the predictions of standard
quantum mechanics may be reconstructed, thus eliminating probability from
the description of any single measurement. The interpretation attained, the
Teleological Interpretation, is an ontological one; it is local and deterministic.
Other special assumptions in the choice of the final boundary condition may
explain certain unaccounted for phenomena, or even supply a mechanism for
essential free will. In this context we believe that a new conception of time
should be adopted.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We start by presenting in Chapter 2 some of the conceptual difficulties in the
foundations of quantum mechanics. They include the measurement problem,
problems which arise in various popular interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics and the problem of defining classicality. These fundamental issues are
subjects of many discussions taking different approaches, and we wish to
present the conceptual common ground necessary for the understanding of
our work, and put it in uniform terminology.
In Chapter 3 we briefly review the time-symmetric reformulation of quan-
tum mechanics, in which the suggested interpretation is formulated. In this
formalism, two temporal boundary conditions are assumed: an initial one
and a final one. Two wave-functions are evolved from these, respectively:
the standard one, which we call the history vector, and a backwards evolving
one, the hermitian adjoint of which we call the destiny vector. These are
combined to form the two-state, constituting the complete description of any
system. Final boundary conditions are usually introduced by post-selection
of the measured system, taking into account only the experiments which yield
a specific outcome. We wish to generalize this formulation to be applicable
also to closed systems, namely to the universe. We show that the density
matrix of the closed universe in standard quantum mechanics is a special
case of its possible two-states in the time-symmetric formalism. From here
on we work in the frame of the two state vector formalism and are interested
only in the unitary evolution of two-states and in the reduced two-states of
their subsystems.
In Chapter 4 we suggest choosing a special final boundary condition which
solves the measurement problem. This is done by setting the final states of
measuring devices as one of their classically possible pointer states, according
to the measurements in which they are involved, with a probability distri-
bution that reconstructs the predictions of standard quantum mechanics for
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large ensembles of such measurements. By this, probability is eliminated
from the description of any single measurement, and its specific outcome
may be calculated, given its boundary conditions. We analyze ideal mea-
surements and show how effective reduction is attained without the need of
supplemental mechanisms, thus solving the measurement problem. Here we
introduce the process of “two-time decoherence”, which, we show, governs
the behaviour of the measuring device. We next consider non-ideal weak
measurements, where a weak interaction between the measuring device and
the system being measured takes place, and the outcome is the expected
value of the operator dependent of the boundary conditions. Clearly these
kind of measurements may be naturally described using the two-state formal-
ism. We remark that weak values, or the strange outcomes obtained from
weak observations, may be used to explain miscellaneous unaccounted for
phenomena.
In Chapter 5 we discuss the validity of classical properties such as local-
ity, causality, realism, determinism and free will, in the framework of our
interpretation. This discussion is mainly philosophical, but is also an indis-
pensable part of a complete picture of any interpretation. We argue that
all properties excluding realism are valid. We further suggest a mechanism
which allows essential free will within the framework of the suggested inter-
pretation, and claim that in this context a more complex approach to the
concept of time should be adopted.
Chapter 6 constitutes a discussion of ideas which relate to the interpre-
tation suggested, and a summary of our work.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 The Measurement Problem
Quantum theory was originally intended to describe the behaviour of mi-
croscopic particles, and indeed it predicts with great accuracy the outcomes
of experiments in this regime. Furthermore, quantum theory has supplied
explanations to phenomena previously unaccounted for, such as the spec-
trum of black body radiation. Today quantum theory is almost unanimously
accepted as correct.
Nevertheless quantum theory raises considerable physical and philosoph-
ical difficulties regarding the usage of classical concepts such as locality, re-
alism, determinism and so forth. The difficulty intensifies when we attempt
to apply quantum theory to the macroscopic regime, meaning also to our
measuring devices – an action that seems legitimate, for also they are made
of microscopic particles. At first sight, it seems that in order to build a
theoretical model which may reconstruct the empirical results, one needs to
define an observer or a measuring device external to the observed quantum
system, one which does not obey the normal evolution rules of quantum me-
chanics. This of course is not desired, because then quantum theory will be
incomplete, in the sense that it will not describe all physical nature. This is
known as the measurement problem.
The measurement problem can be simply demonstrated in the following
manner. An experiment is performed on a spin-1
2
particle in order to find
its spin component along some axis. Let the initial state of the particle
be 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉). The initial state of the measuring device is |R〉 (device
“READY”). Now assume an interaction between the particle and the mea-
suring device takes place, such that if the device measures | ↑〉, it evolves
into the state |U〉 (device measured “UP”), and if it measures | ↓〉, it evolves
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into the state |D〉 (device measured “DOWN”). The evolution predicted by
quantum mechanics is
1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | ↓〉)⊗ |R〉 −→ 1√
2
(| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉+ | ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉) . (2.1)
But we know from everyday practice (assume we are experimentalists) that
when measuring a spin-1
2
particle as above, we get | ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉 in 50% of the
cases and | ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉 in the other 50%, not a superposition of the two as in
(2.1).
In general, the experiment shows that after an ideal measurement, the
quantum system is found to be in one of the eigenstates of the measured
operator, correlated to the appropriate state of the measuring device. For
pre-selected ensembles this happens with a probability equal to the absolute
value of the projection of the initial state on the specific eigenstate, squared.
In order to explain this gap between theory and observed reality, dif-
ferent interpretations of quantum mechanics have been suggested, or better
phrased, different interpretations of our observations. Their common goal
is to provide the most complete description of physical reality possible, and
to settle some of the contradictions between quantum theory and classical
concepts.
2.2 Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
Generally, interpretations of quantum mechanics can be divided into two
main categories. The first kind explains our observations by supplementing
the evolution rules of quantum mechanics with the concept of a random
“collapse of the wave-function”. A reduction of the quantum superposition
state to a classical state is supposed to take place at some stage of the
measurement process. These interpretations are problematic because the
collapse is non-local [1], the collapse mechanism, if at all specified, gives a
nondeterministic outcome, and Occam’s razor, the principle of simplicity, is
unsympathetic to the excessive collapse rule.
A second kind of interpretation attempts to explain experimental out-
comes deterministically, without the need of a collapse. Among these are
“hidden variables” interpretations and “relative state” interpretations. hid-
den variables interpretations, following Bohm [2], assume the existence of
inaccessible variables with definite values, which determine the state after
the measurement. Bell [3], in his famous inequality theorem, and recently
the GHZ [4] [5] argument, show that these kind of theories are inherently non-
local. Also it is not clear how the empirical probabilities, as they arise in the
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standard theory, are to be reconstructed. The different variations of the rel-
ative state interpretation (such as “many worlds” or “many-minds”), which
are themselves interpretations of Everett’s original suggestion [6], settle the
measurement problem by attributing different observations to the different
states of consciousness correlated to them. In these interpretations there is
no simple relation of the empirical probabilities to the possible outcomes. In
fact it is assumed that all possible outcomes and observations coexist, so one
cannot explain why he is the one observing a certain outcome. Both of these
non-collapse interpretations also contain some multiplicity of entities (vari-
ables, worlds), needed for the description of the system, against the spirit of
Occam’s razor.
It is worth commenting that we have discussed only ontological interpreta-
tions whereas epistemological ones exist also. The former are interpretations
in the sense we have described: they attempt to explain our observations by
giving a broader, presumably complete description of physical nature. The
latter confine themselves to give a set of logical rules regarding our knowledge
of reality, putting aside the discussion of what is really happening. We find
this kind of interpretations unsatisfactory, and perhaps even opposed to the
spirit of the science of physics.
In this work we suggest a new ontological interpretation, which attempts
to overcome the difficulties mentioned. Namely it is local, deterministic
and simple, and it reconstructs the empirical probability rules of standard
quantum mechanics. The classical properties mentioned in this section will
be defined more precisely and be further discussed in Chapter 5.
2.3 Classicality and Decoherence
The measurement problem, as it arises in a situation where a classical appa-
ratus is measuring a quantum system, is tightly connected to the definition
of the classicality of systems. A classical system, by definition, is a system
which does not exhibit quantum-like behaviour in some sense. Generally,
we recognize one definite classical basis of states, of which our classical sys-
tem assumes one specific state. We do not observe superpositions among
classical states, in contrast to the case of quantum states. Accordingly we
may postulate that it is not possible to interfere or mix the phases between
two classical states. In the case of a measurement process, it can be further
shown that without a scheme of choosing the classical basis and a postulate
such as above, it is not even well defined what observable is being measured
[7] [8]. This is sometimes referred to as the problem of the preferred basis.
Selection of a classical basis and the destruction of phase coherence can
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be achieved in the framework of standard quantum mechanics, by the dy-
namical process of environment induced superselection or decoherence, first
introduced by Zurek [7] [8] [9]. Here it is assumed that the to-be-classical
apparatus is being constantly monitored by an environment, singling out an
almost orthogonal basis. The additional degrees of freedom, now coupled to
the different apparatus states in this basis, prohibit a change of this basis.
Doing so will result in the destruction of any previous correlations of the ap-
paratus with other systems, such as the system being measured. Note that
such a correlation is essential for the definition of the classical basis. Due to
the near orthogonality of the environment states, when tracing out the envi-
ronmental degrees of freedom, one notices that the off-diagonal interference
terms in the reduced density matrix are negligible. Therefore no projection
onto a superposition of classical states can take place. Here it is assumed
that the experimenter cannot take into account the environment itself, when
performing such an experiment, since in realistic situations the exact state
of at least part of the environment is unknown. Up to now we have not yet
solved the measurement problem – no reduction to a single classical state
has occurred, but importantly a basis for the reduction has been defined.
The environment in discussion is the dominant part of the systems “not
of interest”, interacting with our apparatus. Usually these may take the
form of internal parts of our macroscopic device, where the aforementioned
“apparatus” is but the device’s pointer. The classical states of the preferred
basis are called “preferred states” or “pointer states”. As a result of the di-
agonality of the density matrix, these states are insensitive to measurements
performed on them, in agreement with our classical experience. By contrast,
quantum states change or undergo “preparation” with each new measure-
ment. Therefore we may relate classicality to predictability. Zurek [10] has
even suggested a predictability sieve, in order to identify the classical states
by the length of time that they maintain predictability. With this in mind we
shall later relate different time measures to different measures of classicality
of systems, where for ideal classical systems, we would like the time they
remain predictable to be almost infinite or at least longer than the lifetime
of the universe.
To conclude the discussion we shall rederive a simple toy model of de-
coherence presented in Ref. [8]. This model will be later used also in the
context of our interpretation. Let us start with the initial state a| ↑〉+ b| ↓〉
for the quantum system and |R〉 = 1√
2
(|U〉+ |D〉) for the apparatus, both at
time t0 = 0. Assume an interaction Hamiltonian between them of the form
Hsa = −gσ(s)z ⊗ σ(a)y , (2.2)
where g is a constant, σy and σz are Pauli matrices, and we write all states
7
in the basis of eigenstates of σz, (s) designates system and (a) designates
apparatus. Let the interaction take place for a time
t1 =
pih¯
4g
. (2.3)
The evolution will be 1
1√
2
(a| ↑〉+ b| ↓〉)⊗ (|U〉+ |D〉) −→ a| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉+ b| ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉. (2.4)
Next take the state obtained and couple it to an environment consisting
of N two-level particles with the basis {|u〉k, |d〉k}Nk=1, in the initial state∏N
k=1⊗ (αk|u〉k + βk|d〉k). Assume an interaction Hamiltonian between the
apparatus and environment of the form
Hae = −σ(a)z ⊗
N∑
k=1
gkσ
(e)
z,k
∏
j 6=k
⊗1j , (2.5)
where gk are constants, (e) designates environment and 1 is the unit operator.
The evolution is
(a| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉+ b| ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉)
N∏
k=1
⊗ (αk|u〉k + βk|d〉k) −→
−→ a| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉 ⊗ |εU (t− t1)〉+ b| ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉 ⊗ |εD (t− t1)〉, (2.6)
where
|εU (t′)〉=
N∏
k=1
⊗ (αk exp (igkt′/h¯) |u〉k + βk exp (−igkt′/h¯) |d〉k) , (2.7)
|εD (t′)〉=
N∏
k=1
⊗ (αk exp (−igkt′/h¯) |u〉k + βk exp (igkt′/h¯) |d〉k) (2.8)
are the environment states which correspond to the superselected pointer
states. Tracing out the environment, the reduced system-apparatus density
matrix obtained is
ρDENsa(t) = treρ
DEN(t)=|a|2| ↑〉〈↑ | ⊗ |U〉〈U|+
+z(t− t1)ab∗| ↑〉〈↓ | ⊗ |U〉〈D|+
+z∗(t− t1)ba∗| ↓〉〈↑ | ⊗ |D〉〈U|+
+|b|2| ↓〉〈↓ | ⊗ |D〉〈D| (2.9)
1Derivations may be found in Appendix A.
8
where
z(t′) = 〈εU(t′)|εD(t′)〉 =
N∏
k=1
(
cos (2gkt
′/h¯) + i
(
|αk|2 − |βk|2
)
sin (2gkt
′/h¯)
)
(2.10)
is the correlation amplitude. The temporal average of the absolute value of
this amplitude is
|z(t′)|2 = lim
T→∞
T−1
∫ T
0
|z(τ)|2dτ = 2−N
N∏
k=1
(
1 +
(
|αk|2 − |βk|2
)2)
. (2.11)
This implies that for large enough an environment, consisting of many N
particles, z(t) is negligible in average, and the diagonal terms of (2.9), which
contain it as a factor, are damped out. Thus after some finite decoherence
time, an effective pointer basis has been established, and neither change of
basis nor projection onto a superposition of basis states are possible. The
only difficulty with this toy model is that since z(t) is of the almost-periodic
function family, as long as N is finite, any value of its range will recur an
infinite number of times [12]. Thus z(t) will eventually return to assume non-
negligible values causing recoherence. Only when the environmental degrees
of freedom have a continuous spectrum of eigenstates, can an infinitely long
recoherence time be attained.
Classical systems should have a very short decoherence time and a reco-
herence time longer than the lifetime of the universe. These can be achieved
when the environment is large, as indeed characterizes measuring devices,
which are macroscopic and therefore have large environments. Of course a
more realistic model of an environment should be used. Since physical in-
teractions are usually a function of distance, given by a potential, we would
expect the pointer basis to be a position basis, so that the different states
are localized. However up to now we have ignored the free Hamiltonian of
the apparatus and environment, assuming that they were commutative with
the interaction Hamiltonian. This is generally not true because the momen-
tum terms of the free Hamiltonians are not commutative with the interaction
potential. Thus a condition for localization is massiveness of the apparatus
[11], which suppresses the non-local terms. This again is true for macroscopic
devices.
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Chapter 3
Time Symmetric Quantum
Mechanics
3.1 Background
In their famous 1964 article, ABL [13] suggested a new rule for calculating
probability. In the case that a final state Ψf is specified for the measured
system, in addition to the usual choice of an initial state Ψi, the probability
that an intermediate measurement of an operator A yields the eigenstate |ak〉
is
prob(ak | Ψi,Ψf)= prob(Ψf(t) | ak)prob(ak | Ψi(t))∑
j prob(Ψf(t) | aj)prob(aj | Ψi(t))
=
=
|〈Ψf(t)|ak〉|2|〈ak|Ψi(t)〉|2∑
j |〈Ψf(t)|aj〉|2|〈aj|Ψi(t)〉|2
, (3.1)
where ak ∈ {aj}j, an eigenbasis of the measured operator A, and we assume
that an instantaneous measurement occurs at a time t intermediate of the
boundary conditions, to which all wave-functions are evolved. If the mea-
surement is not instantaneous, the initial and final wave-functions should be
taken at the beginning and ending of the measurement interaction, respec-
tively (assuming no free evolution of the wave-functions in between).
If only the initial condition is specified, (3.1) should reduce to the regular
empirical probability rule:
prob(ak | Ψi) = |〈ak|Ψi(t)〉|2. (3.2)
Formula (3.1) is actually an application of the simple conditional probability
formula to the quantum case. But a conceptual leap has been made in the
recognition that boundary conditions may be chosen time-symmetrically in
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contrast to the conventional asymmetric choice of an initial condition only.
The gauntlet has been thrown down: why should boundary conditions be
chosen with such a discrimination?
Later Aharonov et. al. introduced the concept of weak measurement and
weak values [14] [15]. The idea is as follows. If one performs an isolated, weak
interaction measurement, where the measured system is almost undisturbed
and no reduction takes place, his apparatus will show the expected value of
the measured operator, with a weighing of the appropriate probabilities. A
condition for this, as will be discussed in Section 4.3, is the existence of a
large enough uncertainty in the pointer’s initial state. Then the pointer’s
final state will be spread around the expected value, and the final outcome
observed by us, will be the result of an ideal measurement on this spread
state, with the appropriate probability distribution.
When only an initial boundary condition is specified for the quantum
system, or when the final condition is identical to the initial condition, one
gets after interaction the expectation value
〈A〉 ≡ 〈Ψi|A|Ψi〉 =
∑
k
akprob(ak | Ψi). (3.3)
In the general case when both initial and final boundary conditions are speci-
fied the outcome is the weak value Aw, which may be far from any eigenstate
of the measured operator
Aw ≡ 〈Ψf |A|Ψi〉〈Ψf |Ψi〉 ∝
∑
k
ak
√
prob(ak | Ψi,Ψf), (3.4)
where the times at which the wave-functions are taken are as above. Notice
that in (3.4) the appropriate weighing of each eigenvalue is proportional to
the square root of the ABL probability (3.1).
The final boundary condition may result, for example, from post-selection
of the system after the interaction has taken place, which can be achieved by
performing an ideal measurement, and discarding the cases with unwanted
outcomes. Alternatively, some systems in nature (as, we shall suggest, the
universe) may have an inherent final boundary condition, just as all systems
have initial ones. Weak values may play an important role in the under-
standing of certain phenomena such as tunneling [16] or Hawking radiation
from a black hole [17]. Later, we shall consider weak measurements in the
frame of our interpretation.
In order to reduce the time-symmetric case to the pre-selected-only case,
one must choose the final state identical to the initial state. This is imme-
diately apparent when comparing the weak value formula, left equation in
11
(3.4), with the expectation value formula, left equation in (3.3). A gener-
alization to closed systems is achieved by taking the final condition as the
initial condition evolved to the final time, as will be shown in Section 3.3.
However when reducing the ABL formula (3.1) to the regular probability for-
mula (3.2), one must choose the final condition as the measured |ak〉, which
is actually the evolved initial state, assuming it has undergone reduction to
a specific eigenstate. This discrepancy arises due to the use of a probabilistic
formula which is foreign to our unitary formalism. This choice is also a clue
for the upcoming suggestion which will later justify it.
3.2 The Two State Vector Formalism
Following Ref. [18], we wish to reformulate quantum mechanics, to be time-
symmetric, in the sense that it will take into account both initial and final
boundary conditions. The Schro¨dinger equation is first order in the time
derivative, therefore only one temporal boundary condition may be consis-
tently specified for a solution of the equation. Assuming both initial and final
boundary conditions exist, we must have two solutions suitable for each of
the two boundary conditions. The first is the regular wave-function evolved
forward in time from the initial condition, which we call the “history vector”
and denote by |ΨHIS(t)〉. The second is a different wave-function evolving
from the future final condition, backwards in time. We call the hermitian ad-
joint of this vector the “destiny vector”, denoted by |ΨDES(t)〉. We postulate
that the complete description of any system is given by two vectors as such.
These may be combined into operator form by defining the “two-state”
ρ(t) ≡ |ΨHIS(t)〉〈ΨDES(t)|〈ΨDES(t)|ΨHIS(t)〉 . (3.5)
This, in general, is not reducible to a single wave-function. It is clear that
orthogonal boundary conditions are forbidden, therefore
〈ΨDES(t)|ΨHIS(t)〉 6= 0, (3.6)
which is a reasonable choice due to the fact that a final state, orthogonal
to the initial state, has probability zero for being post-selected. For a given
Hamiltonian H(t), the time evolution of the two-state from time t1 to t2 is
ρ(t2) = U(t2, t1)ρ(t1)U(t1, t2), (3.7)
where U(t2, t1) is the regular evolution operator
U(t2, t1) = exp
(
−i/h¯
∫ t2
t1
H(τ)dτ
)
. (3.8)
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The two-state takes the place of the density matrix in standard quantum
mechanics. Any subsystem’s two-state may be obtained by taking the partial
trace of all other degrees of freedom. In the current work, our formalism
supports only these two operations: unitary time evolution and tracing. No
other formula is allowed nor required, as we shall show in the next chapter.
3.3 The Two-State of the Universe
The Conventional approach to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics assumes
that a complete description of the state of a closed system, such as the
universe, is given at any time t by a wave-function
|Ψ(t)〉 = U(t, t0)|Ψ(t0)〉, (3.9)
where Ψ(t0) is usually defined at some initial time t0 = ti where t > ti,
hence Ψ(t0) is the initial boundary condition Ψi(ti). We shall denote this
wave-function Ψi. The density matrix associated with the state |Ψi(t)〉 is
ρDEN(t) = |Ψi(t)〉〈Ψi(t)|, (3.10)
and the state of any subsystem is obtained by taking the partial trace of all
other degrees of freedom.
We will show that the above description is consistent with the assumption
of a special final boundary condition of the form
|Ψf(tf )〉 = U(tf , ti)|Ψi(ti)〉, (3.11)
at the final time tf , for a backward evolving wave-function denoted Ψf . This
will be established by writing the two-state at any intermediate time. Up to
a normalization factor
ρ(t)=|Ψi(t)〉〈Ψf(t)| =
=|Ψi(t)〉〈Ψf(tf )|U(tf , t) =
=|Ψi(t)〉〈Ψi(ti)|U(tf , ti)U(tf , t) =
=|Ψi(t)〉〈Ψi(ti)|U(ti, t) =
=|Ψi(t)〉〈Ψi(t)| = ρDEN(t). (3.12)
Therefore if only an initial boundary condition is assumed, in all calculations
two-states may by substituted by density matrices, giving the same results.
In the previous section’s notation we have simply taken the destiny vector
to be equal to the history vector.
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Under the assumption of a deterministic evolution rule for the universe,
which will be justified later, we have shown that our formalism is reducible
to the conventional one, the latter being a special case of the former. Taking
final boundary conditions different from (3.11), our formalism introduces a
richer state structure into quantum theory. This is a generalization, to the
closed universe, of the ABL suggestion, of choosing two temporal boundary
conditions for the system being measured.
In the next chapter we suggest postulating a very special final boundary
condition at the final time, a time which should be as late as the lifetime of
the universe, whether the universe ends in a singularity, in relaxation to a
steady state, or is infinite in time.
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Chapter 4
Teleological Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics
4.1 The Suggestion
We are now ready to present our suggestion for a new interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, the Teleological Interpretation. The Webster New Collegiate
Dictionary defines “Teleology” as
1 a: the study of evidences of design in nature b: a doctrine
(as in vitalism) that ends are immanent in nature c: a doctrine
explaining phenomena by final causes 2: the fact or character
attributed to nature or natural processes of being directed toward
an end or shaped by a purpose 3: the use of design or purpose as
an explanation of natural phenomena.
We argue that special final conditions may exist, so that if they are taken
into account, the probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics may be
explained. Setting aside for the moment the mechanism by which a proper
chosen final state causes an effective reduction to the appropriate desired
outcome, we wish to present the scheme by which the final states should by
selected. We argue that a universe set up as follows behaves as predicted
by standard quantum mechanics, such as we believe our universe does, using
only unitary Schro¨dinger evolution.
• Choose the universe’s initial boundary condition.
• Choose the universal Hamiltonian.
• Identify the classical systems and their preferred basis.
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• Identify measurement-like interactions between classical and quantum
systems.
• Assign the universe’s final boundary condition as the initial one, evolved
to the final time, with the following exceptions:
– For classical systems select one of the preferred basis states (nor-
malized) from the superposition, while ensuring that the proba-
bility distribution for measurements on large ensemble match the
one predicted by the regular probability rules.
– Set special final states to produce strange phenomena (optional).
– Set special final states to match the free will of sentient beings
(optional).
Assuming such boundary conditions for the universe, ideal “probabilistic”
and non-ideal weak measurements will be analyzed in the following sections.
Other than determining the preset distribution, the probability rules men-
tioned in Section 3.1 need not to be applied in any manner, on the contrary,
we treat them as empirical rules and show how their predictions are recon-
structed. Therefore no “projections” should be applied to the system during
the measurement process. We must stress that in most situations the final
classical states are not known to us prior to the completion of the measure-
ment, and are assumed to be such or the other for the sake of the compu-
tational examples. The reader should not concern himself at this stage with
questions of the amount of freedom of choice in performing different mea-
surements. We will later examine the applicability of the concept of free will
in the framework of the suggested interpretation.
4.2 Ideal Measurements
In this section we shall analyze the ideal measurement process, and show
how effective reduction takes place. For the sake of simplicity, we stick with
the decoherence toy model presented in Section 2.3. Although simple, it is
important to take such a dynamic model in order to fully understand the
relevant processes. There is some resemblance to the work done in Ref. [19].
Recall the state obtained in Section 2.3 after decoherence. Let us take this
state as our history vector
|ΨHIS(t)〉 = a| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉 ⊗ |εU (t− t1)〉+ b| ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉 ⊗ |εD (t− t1)〉, (4.1)
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where t1 was some finite system-apparatus interaction time and |U〉, |D〉 were
superselected as the classical pointer states. Let us assume that the environ-
ment associated with these states is large enough so that the recoherence
time, or the time which takes the correlation amplitude to revert to a non-
negligible value, is longer than the lifetime of the universe. It is then possible
to assign the final boundary condition as
|...〉 ⊗ |U〉 ⊗ |εU (tf)〉, (4.2)
for example, where |...〉 are unknown systems correlated to our pointer state,
and a specific state was chosen for the pointer |U〉, from its classical basis,
correlated to the adequate environment state of that time |εU (tf)〉. Such a
choice is reasonable because after decoherence has taken place and before re-
coherence, no interference between the pointer states can take place anyway.
The quantum system, by contrast, has a certain definite state only until the
next measurement made on it, which prepares it in a new state
|φ〉 = c| ↑〉+ d| ↓〉, (4.3)
which takes the role of an effective final boundary condition for the quantum
system as will be soon showed. Therefore the destiny vector at a time after
the measurement interaction is over is
|ΨDES(t)〉 = |φ〉 ⊗ |U〉 ⊗ |εU (t− t1)〉. (4.4)
The complete description of our systems is given up to a normalization factor
by the two-state
ρ(t)=|ΨHIS(t)〉〈ΨDES(t)| =
=a| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉 ⊗ |εU (t− t1)〉〈φ| ⊗ 〈U| ⊗ 〈εU (t− t1)|+
+b| ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉 ⊗ |εD (t− t1)〉〈φ| ⊗ 〈U| ⊗ 〈εU (t− t1)|. (4.5)
Ignoring the environment the reduced two-state obtained is
ρsa(t) = treρ(t)=a| ↑〉〈φ| ⊗ |U〉〈U|+
+z∗(t− t1)b| ↓〉〈φ| ⊗ |D〉〈U|. (4.6)
Refer to Section 2.3 to recall the behaviour of z(t). It is evident that after
a decoherence time an effective reduction of the pointer to the state: |U〉〈U|
has occurred. We call this process “two-time decoherence” differing it from
the regular meaning of decoherence.
While the above is true for the pointer involved in the original measure-
ment, notice that the state of the quantum system and the state of any ap-
paratus performing further measurements in the same basis of the quantum
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system or original pointer, experience immediate effective reduction, with no
decoherence time delay. This becomes evident, after tracing out the original
pointer’s degree of freedom, as in the above example, the off-diagonal term
which contained |U〉〈D| vanishes in their reduced two-states. In the “old”
probabilistic nomenclature, applying the ABL rule, the original pointer has
probability 1 to be found (by those correlated systems) in the reduced state,
and probability 0 to be found in any other state. Therefore in a realistic ex-
periment where a chain of measurements exists, one should expect to observe
immediate reduction, in contrast to the prediction of the many worlds inter-
pretation, for example, which states that a decoherence time until effective
reduction, should always be expected. This may be an important deviation
point when comparing which of the two interpretations is more applicable.
It may be that the two-time decoherence does not play an important role in
the measurement chain, but as we have shown, it naturally emerges from the
combination of regular decoherence needed for classicality, and the two-state
formalism with our special final boundary condition. Of course it remains
essential that the final state is chosen from the classical pointer states su-
perselected by regular decoherence. In the many worlds picture where each
superposition term is viewed as a branching world, we have simply selected
one specific branch. Such a view may help seeing why the interpretation
suggested is self consistent, and why is it naturally demanded, if one does
not wish to have a multitude of “worlds”.
It remains to show how the effective reduction determines the backward
evolving state of the quantum system, for a previous measurement, as the
process presented above shows effective reduction only after a finite positive
time duration of the system-apparatus interaction. Evolving the destiny
vector at time t1, (c| ↑〉+ d| ↓〉)⊗ |U〉, backwards to the time t0 = 0 (which
was chosen for convenience as the beginning of the measurement), the two-
state of the quantum system and apparatus obtained is (up to normalization)
ρsa(0)=ac
∗| ↑〉〈↑ | ⊗ |R〉〈R|+ ad∗| ↑〉〈↓ | ⊗ |R〉〈L|+
+bc∗| ↓〉〈↑ | ⊗ |R〉〈R|+ bd∗| ↓〉〈↓ | ⊗ |R〉〈L|, (4.7)
where |R〉 = 1√
2
(|U〉+ |D〉) and |L〉 = 1√
2
(|U〉 − |D〉). Taking the partial
trace on the apparatus’ degree of freedom, shows that the backward evolving
vector of the quantum state is 〈↑ | as expected from this process, in which the
outcome was “UP”. This sets a final boundary condition for the quantum
state in a previous measurement, in the same manner that we have taken
into account the state |φ〉 from the next measurement.
We have shown how effective reduction may take place in an ideal mea-
surement when the final state of the classical apparatus is chosen as one of
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its possible classical states after the measurement. Setting a final boundary
condition for the classical states at a very late time, enables them to stay
predictable as expected. Conversely, the quantum system is “prepared” at
each measurement in a new state which constitutes an effective boundary
conditions for both the next and previous measurement. In our analysis we
have treated these as our initial and final boundary conditions for simplicity,
bringing the final apparatus state from the absolute final time, under the
assumption that it has not undergone any further interaction. We have thus
formulated a connection between the classicality of a system and the length
of time between its initial and final boundary conditions.
Our example considers only a single measurement process per measur-
ing device. If the apparatus undergoes multiple interactions, always some
initialization process of the measuring device must take place, one which is
dependent on the previous measurement’s outcome. This is obvious, due to
the fact that information cannot be lost but is always transferred to other
systems. Hence, the information of most of the measurements’ outcomes
reside in those systems’ final state.
4.3 Weak Measurements
We now wish to analyze non-ideal weak measurements, which may be natu-
rally described using the two-state formalism. A weak measurement is one
in which the precision of the measurement is low enough, so that negligible
change would be induced to the measured system. In a weak measurement
the measuring device gets correlated to the different eigenstates of the sys-
tem, but no reduction to a specific eigenstate takes place. What is measured
is an average “weak” value of the operator, which is dependent on the initial
and final states of the system. Let us take a many level quantum system in
a basis of the states |ak〉 on which the operator A is defined as
A =
∑
k
ak|ak〉〈ak|. (4.8)
The initial state of the system is chosen to be
|φ1〉 =
∑
k
ck|ak〉, (4.9)
where ck are constants. Next we take the measuring device as a pointer,
with its position q described by a Gaussian-like function Q(q), initially set
as Q(0). We let an interaction between the system and apparatus take place
under the Hamiltonian
H = −g(t)PA, (4.10)
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until the time t1, where ∫ t1
0
g(τ)dτ = 1, (4.11)
and P is the operator of the momentum conjugate to q. The evolved state
of the apparatus after the time t1 is given by the law:
exp (iakP/h¯) |Q(0)〉 = |Q(ak)〉, (4.12)
for eigenvalues ak of A. Let us take the initial state of our composite system
to be
|Ψi(0)〉 = |φ1〉 ⊗ |Q(0)〉. (4.13)
At the time t = t1 the evolved initial state is
|Ψi(t1)〉 =
∑
k
ck|ak〉 ⊗ |Q(ak)〉. (4.14)
At some time t2 > t1 we perform an ideal measurement on the quantum
system and obtain the result
|φ2〉 =
∑
k
c′k|ak〉, (4.15)
which serves as a final boundary condition for the quantum system as ex-
plained in the previous section. A calculation shows that the final composite
state must then be
|Ψf(t2)〉 = |φ2〉〈φ2| ⊗ |Ψi(t1)〉 = |φ2〉 ⊗
∑
j
cjc
′∗
j |Q(aj)〉. (4.16)
The two-state at a time t between t1 and t2 (after interaction and before
post-selection, and assuming no free evolution) is given up to a normalization
factor by
ρ(t) = |Ψi(t1)〉〈Ψf(t2)|, (4.17)
and the apparatus’ pointer will show
ρa(t) = trsρ(t) =
∑
k,j
ckc
′∗
k c
∗
jc
′
j|Q(ak)〉〈Q(aj)|. (4.18)
The condition for weakness of the measurement is that the Gaussians are
wide enough so that the relation
∑
k
ckc
′∗
k |Q(ak)〉 ∼=
∑
k
ckc
′∗
k |Q(a′)〉 ≡ |Qˆ(a′)〉, (4.19)
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for some a′, holds due to their interference. Then tracing out the quantum
system’s degree of freedom, the apparatus reads
ρa(t) ∼= |Qˆ(a′)〉〈Qˆ(a′)|, (4.20)
where it is shown that a′ equals Aw, the weak value of A,
Aw =
〈φ1|A|φ2〉
〈φ1|φ2〉 =
∑
k ckc
′∗
k ak∑
k ckc
′∗
k
, (4.21)
by computing the weak value of the evolution operator, as follows:
∑
k
ckc
′∗
k |Q(ak)〉=
∑
k
ckc
′∗
k exp (iakP/h¯) |Q(0)〉 =
=〈φ2| exp (iAP/h¯) |φ1〉|Q(0)〉 =
=
∞∑
n=1
(iP/h¯)n
n!
〈φ2|An|φ1〉|Q(0)〉 =
=〈φ2|φ1〉 exp (iAwP/h¯) |Q(0)〉+
+
∞∑
n=2
(iP/h¯)n
n!
(〈φ2|An|φ1〉 − 〈φ2|A|φ1〉n) |Q(0)〉 ∼=
∼=〈φ2|φ1〉 exp (iAwP/h¯) |Q(0)〉 = |Qˆ(Aw)〉, (4.22)
where we have applied the usual condition for weakness [14] [15], which
requires that the terms with n > 1 in the Taylor expansion are negligible,
given the choice of a wide enough initial Gaussian.
It is clear that after the post-selection takes place, the weak value emerges
as a consequence of a projection onto the new quantum state. The weak
value actually exist also before the post-selection, after the system-apparatus
interaction is completed. This fact is usually explained by the reasoning
that the order of actions, looking at the pointer and performing the post-
selection, is unimportant, as the post-selection cannot affect the measuring
device after the measuring interaction is over. Thus the apparatus must
show the same value even before post-selection takes place. In the above
two-state formulation, the weak measurement is clearly seen to arise before
the post-selection, when looking at the reduced two-state of the apparatus
after tracing out the quantum system.
If the weakness condition is not satisfied but the measurement is not
an ideal one, we are dealing with a regime of measurement of intermediate
strength. In some of these cases, the outcome of the measurement may be
given by a combination of the ideal and weak mechanisms, as the outcome
of an ideal measurement on a set of different weak values [18].
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Measurements performed by us, on large, uncontrollable systems, may
satisfy the weakness condition. Measurements of galactic properties which
yield too large a spin or magnetic moment or mass, may be due to a special
final boundary condition for that stellar object, which yields a weak value, far
from the expected eigenvalue, calculated by theoretical means. The problem
of the missing mass, a recent discovery that the universe seems too young
or more generally inconsistencies in measurements of the cosmological con-
stants by different methods [20], may as well be explained by a special final
boundary condition for the universe. Another example may be the observa-
tion that the calculated number of Darwin mutations seems to be too low
to explain the genetic evolution of complex life forms. Perhaps these sorts
of strange phenomena may be explained by assuming the existence of spe-
cial final boundary conditions for these systems, which would appear to us as
new fundamental laws of our universe. Of course when dealing with everyday
low-energy short-duration experiments, these should reduce to give the ex-
pected regular results [17]. It might trouble some physicists, or please others,
if such a special boundary condition could be used to break the restrictions
of causality.
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Chapter 5
The Classical Properties
5.1 Causality, Locality and Realism
In this discussion we refer to “causality” as the impossibility of superluminal
signaling or of advanced action. In the context of quantum theory this means
that probability distribution of experiments’ outcomes cannot be affected by
events outside of their past light cone. We use “locality” for the stronger
property of complete prohibition of any action at a distance or advanced
action, meaning that there may be no influence on any events outside the
future light-cone, including the quantum state itself, even if it does not imply
defiance of causality. The second property (and of course the first, being
implied by it) should exist in order to retain consistency with the theory of
relativity, which we axiomatically assume holds.
The standard quantum theory does not contradict the concept of causality
in any relativistic or nonrelativistic setup [21] [22] [23]. We wish to show that
causality is maintained also in the framework of the suggested interpretation.
Causality requires ignorance of the future boundary state, if such exists, for
knowledge of it would allow the existence of the above restricted effects.
It is to be remembered that in all examples of the previous chapters, the
final boundary state was assumed to take a specific state, for the sake of
demonstration, and generally, it cannot be known a-priori. In fact only when
an second identical measurement is performed in sequence to the preparation
measurement, can the final state be known for certain (“with probability 1”).
In the discussion of ideal measurements in Section 4.2, we have shown that
our interpretation is consistent with the conventional formalism and therefore
causal. Neither can weak measurements defy causality, because, due to the
weakness condition, there is large uncertainty in the outcome of the weak
measurement, and it may yield values in the proximity of a strange value,
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appropriate to some final condition, also for other final conditions. In fact, an
error as such will result in the majority of cases. Therefore it is not possible
to deduce from the outcome of a weak measurement on the final state.
In order to demonstrate how forbidden knowledge of a final boundary
state (a non-causal state of affairs by itself) could have been used for super-
luminal signaling, examine the following setup. We work with two spin-1
2
particles located at two far away locations. We start with the initial state
1√
2
(| ↑〉L ⊗ | ↑〉R + | ↓〉L ⊗ | ↓〉R), and assume we know the final state to be
1√
2
(| ↑〉L ⊗ | ↑〉R + | ↑〉L ⊗ | ↓〉R), where L denotes the left particle and R the
right particle. An observer on the left may or may not perform a unitary
rotation on his particle of the form | ↑〉L −→ | ↓〉L and | ↓〉L −→ | ↑〉L,
leaving the initial composite state as it is or transforming it into the state
1√
2
(| ↓〉L ⊗ | ↑〉R + | ↑〉L ⊗ | ↓〉R). Now the observer on the right measures
the spin of his particle, obtaining | ↓〉R or | ↑〉R, according to the action or
non-action of his friend on the left. In this manner, the left observer may al-
legedly transmit signals to the right observer in an instant. A procedure like
this would be possible for many arbitrary choices of initial and final states.
The theory of relativity states that physics is simple only when analyzed
locally. Therefore we would like it to be possible to analyze physics locally.
Moreover non-local effects are strange to the theory of relativity as they defy
Lorentz covariance. Quantum theory, due to its linear structure, has an in-
herent non-locality encompassed in its entangled states (a spatially separated
correlated pair, for example). This property is sometimes called “wholeness”
or “inseparability” of quantum mechanics. This non-locality might raise
causality concerns when performing measurements on part of the entangled
state. A local interpretation of quantum mechanics would have to show how
could the outcomes of such a measurement be explained locally. Take for ex-
ample the non-local collapse interpretation; the collapse of the wave-function
is assumed to take place instantaneously in all space. It is well known that
such a phenomenon cannot be used for superluminal signaling, as mentioned
above. But even so, the mere concept of instantaneous state collapse is non-
covariant, for even if the collapse events are simultaneous in some space-time
hyper-surface, these events would not occur at the same time on any other
hyper-surface when changing the frame of reference [1]. This is a common
pitfall of collapse interpretations. On the other hand, the picture presented
by the interpretation suggested by us, gives a purely local explanation for
the effective state reduction.
The property of “realism” or “objectivity”, represents the classical con-
cept that physical nature exist independently of possible observations of it.
The lack of covariance of the collapse process is an example in which the
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description of nature is dependent on the observer. EPR [24] define realism
by the following counterfactual:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict
with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value
of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical
reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
This means that a (possibly “hidden”) variable exists, which determines the
outcome of the measurement. The concern of whether this variable is actu-
ally accessible to us, goes to the discussion of free will in the following section.
As mentioned before in Section 2.2 ([3],[4],[5]) it has been proved that local-
ity and realism cannot coexist in any interpretation of quantum mechanics.
This proof rests on the supplemental assumptions that no non-causal action is
allowed, that asking questions of “what if” is permitted (there is “counterfac-
tual definiteness” [25]) and that there are no predetermined “conspiratorial”
dependencies between what has been measured and what has outcome. Then
no local hidden variables theory can exist, and at least one of these concepts
should be given up. In the many worlds interpretation counterfactual defi-
niteness does not hold, because of the coexistence of multiple outcomes for
a measurement, therefore the discussion of realism is irrelevant. Also in our
interpretation, realism is irrelevant, because we have assumed predetermined
final boundary conditions which determine the outcomes of measurements,
knowing from the initial state and Hamiltonian what observations actually
take place. Bell described such a situation as apparently separate parts of
the world being deeply and conspiratorially entangled.
5.2 Determinism and Free Will
The classic property of “determinism” signifies the ability to completely de-
duce the state of the system at any time, only from the knowledge of its initial
boundary condition and evolution rules. Sometimes this is also referred to
as “causality” but we reserve the latter term for the relativistic meaning dis-
cussed above. The concept of determinism constitutes a main disagreement
point between the different interpretations of the quantum theory. We have
addressed deterministic and nondeterministic interpretations in Section 2.2.
Deterministic interpretations strive to reach a complete description of reality
with the introduction of additional rules into standard quantum mechanics,
in order to make the behaviour of any system predictable in principle, as op-
posed to the random collapse mechanism. This is in the spirit of Einstein’s
famous saying that “God does not play dice”. We claim that our suggested
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interpretation is deterministic in a broader, two-time sense, where the given
boundary conditions also include the final condition. With this, specific out-
comes of measurements are completely accounted for, while the probabilistic
structure arises due to a preset stochastic distribution in the final boundary
condition, and the usual lack of knowledge of the specific final states therein.
The latter is a requirement of causality as discussed before.
The discussion of free will or freedom of choice may seem awkward in the
scope of a thesis in physics, but since these concepts have considerably both-
ered many philosophers (including the author) in their attempt to explain
reality, we find the discussion relevant in the context of a theory which strives
to give a complete description of reality. We make a discrimination between
effective or apparent free will which means that any specific observer may
effectively experience freedom of choice, and essential or real free will which
is more a moral concept, of whether an individual is “really” free, in some
sense, to choose his course of action.
We say that a system has an effective free will, or is a “free agent”, if
at some instant a choice can be made between different possible evolutions,
independently of any accessible past data, or in short, if there is freedom from
the past. A theory which allows the existence of free agents must include
a free-from-the-past mechanism which can supply different outcomes, as a
function of something different from accessible past variables. For example,
if there had existed a mechanism which generates purely random numbers,
it would have served this purpose adequately. The empirical probabilistic
behaviour of quantum mechanics, never mind the interpretation explaining
it, would do as well as a mechanism which permits effective freedom of choice.
Notice that the effective free will experienced by us, Humans, may well be
due to our lack of complete knowledge of the exact past or current state of
the relevant systems (intensified by chaotic processes) and it may even be to
some extent a psychological illusion. By stating that a theory allows effective
free will, we permit but not prove, Humans to be free agents. The possibility
of effective free will is implied by, but does not necessarily imply, lack of
determinism, for we have only required independence of accessible past data,
while also a deterministic theory such as hidden variables can supply the
necessary free-from-the-past mechanism, as the hidden variables determine
the outcome of the measurement, but are themselves inaccessible. We have
further broadened the concept of determinism to be time-symmetric, where
for free will we do not do so, because the future data is anyway inaccessible
to us, due to the restrictions of causality.
The possibility of effective freedom of choice may be demonstrated in
our interpretation as follows. We analyze two large macroscopic isolated
systems, such as two distant galaxies. System A containing Humans and
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system B containing aliens. Assume that in system A the natural time flows
toward the future as usual, while in system B it flows backwards towards
the past. This may be achieved for system B by choosing a special initial
boundary condition such that the entropy decreases with the usual flow of
time as it is in system A; then in system B the thermodynamic arrow of time
is reversed in respect to system A. Assume that both systems are classical
in the sense that system B is monitoring system A without disturbing it.
Now the past of system B encompasses the future state of system A. Call
these data the future boundary condition of system A. As long as system
B does not pass any information to system A (an action which would cause
severe causal problems), system A cannot purposely change its choice to be
inconsistent with (and thus spoil) system B’s memory. Now let system A
be quantum mechanical. Dependence of events on the past is not obliged
because of the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics, as explained
above. In our interpretation this is expressed in the unknown final boundary
condition chosen for the universe. This picture perhaps suits an old saying
of Our Sages in Pirkei Avot, Chapter 3, Verse 19: “All is foreseen and the
choice is given”.
Moving on to essential free will; Humans have such a strong tendency to
believe in their freedom of choice, that whole moral doctrines rely upon it.
We believe that the individual chooses how to act (for example whether to
be good or evil) and therefore he is responsible for his deeds and influences
his fate. We have seen that systems may well effectively behave as having
free will. But when analyzing the origin of a choice made, after discarding all
past dependencies one is left only with the quantum mechanic probabilistic
structure which supplies a stochastic free-from-the-past mechanism. How
can such a mechanism reflect an individual’s free sober choice? Even if
free from the past, effective freedom of choice is not a real choice of the
individual, and the essence of the concept is lost. Actually it is quite difficult
to think of any theoretical model which would allow such a thing. Now
the question should be asked, whether we believe in the concept of free will
strongly enough to demand such a theory. If so, we would like the deviation
required from our current physical theory to be minimal. It may be that our
interpretation could meet these demands. We have mentioned that effective
freedom of choice is due to the probabilistic structure which is embodied in
the final boundary condition in our interpretation. If we assume that for
some reason the states of this boundary condition are somehow compatible
with the volitional choices of Human beings, we can achieve a mechanism for
essential free will. Recalling that the data in the final boundary condition
are inaccessible, we are self consistent as in the example above. Alternatively
one may choose to look at things in the following manner. The complete
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description of any system encompasses both a history vector and a destiny
vector, making the future also part of the system. Discarding its past and
demanding the choice to be made by the system, one is left only with its
future, to determine the choice. This might suggest that a new conception of
time, should be adopted: one in which our treatment of time is more complex
than the usual one-dimensional notion. Such an approach might be necessary
when one attempts to describe the logical picture of events, since the cause
for actions of systems comes from both their past and their future, while the
effect occurs at some present time. Perhaps the words of T. S. Eliot in “Four
Quartets” are suitable for this picture:
Time past and time future
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end, which is always present.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Discussion
It is interesting to compare our suggested interpretation to similar interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics and to related philosophical ideas in general.
In Section 4.2 we have already made some comparisons to the many worlds
interpretation.
The idea of applying quantum mechanics to the whole universe and dis-
cussing its wave-function, and adequate boundary conditions, was introduced
by Hartle and Hawking [26].
The two-state formalism may be extended to a formalism of multiple time
boundaries [18]. Also, consistent history interpretations [27] [28] are based on
a history of projections. As we have shown, such an approach is unnecessary
in order to solve the measurement problem.
In the course of this work we have mainly used the formalism of two-states
for its formal convenience, although as stated before, one may look at the
complete state of the system as constituting the regular history vector, and
of a destiny vector which determines the “fate” of the system. This recalls
the ideas of the philosopher Henry Bergson, of systems having some internal
tendency, or inner motive, “e´lan vital”, towards a certain destiny.
We have not yet considered the question of the role of the quantum me-
chanical measurement process in determining the arrow of time. We rely
on decoherence as the cause of irreversible singling of the classical basis of
states for classical systems, which lasts until the late end of the universe.
Only then do we allow a final boundary condition which causes effective re-
duction. Hence we do not increase the measure of irreversibility beyond that
created by the thermodynamic arrow of time (which itself is usually assumed
to be a consequence of the cosmological arrow of time). Therefore it seems
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that in our interpretation there is no microscopic quantum mechanical reason
for irreversibility, nor does our choice of the special final boundary condition
increase the irreversibility determined by the initial condition of the universe.
6.2 Summary
We have suggested a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, the Teleo-
logical Interpretation. We have shown that a special final boundary condi-
tion may be chosen, one which causes effective reduction consistent with the
predictions of standard quantum mechanics, thus solving the measurement
problem. Because the deviation taken from the conventional theory is mini-
mal, we dare to state that by Occam’s principle, it may well be that such a
final boundary condition indeed exists for our universe.
We think that the suggested interpretation may answer some of the prob-
lems and gaps left by previous interpretations of quantum mechanics. We
hope that this work will be the beginning of an adequate response to the
many articles discussing the time-symmetric formulation of quantum me-
chanics, which end with the statement, that the formulation may lead to a
new interpretation of quantum mechanics.
6.3 Acknowledgments
The Author would like to thank his instructors: Prof. Yakir Aharonov and
Prof. Issachar Unna, for their inspirational guidance of the work. Also much
gratitude goes to Dr. Lev Vaidman, to Dr. Benny Reznik, and to Dr. Daniel
Rohrlich for reviewing and commenting on this work and for many helpful
conversations.
30
Appendix A
Derivation of Discussed States
The following trivial derivations are are given for the completeness of this
work. We use the identities:
exp (icσz) =
(
exp (ic) 0
0 exp (−ic)
)
,
exp (icσy) =
(
cos (c) sin (c)
− sin (c) cos (c)
)
,
where c is a constant, σy and σz are Pauli matrices. The designations (s),
(a) and (e) stand for system, apparatus and environment respectively. g and
gk are constants. Derivation of (2.4):
Hsa = −gσ(s)z ⊗ σ(a)y .
|Ψisa(0)〉 =
1√
2
(a| ↑〉+ b| ↓〉)⊗ (|U〉+ |D〉) .
|Ψisa(0 ≤ t ≤ t1)〉 =
1√
2

 exp
(
igσ(a)y t/h¯
)
0
0 exp
(
−igσ(a)y t/h¯
)


s
(
a
b
)
s
⊗
⊗ (|U〉+ |D〉) = 1√
2
a| ↑〉 ⊗
(
cos (gt/h¯) sin (gt/h¯)
− sin (gt/h¯) cos (gt/h¯)
)
a
(
1
1
)
a
+
+
1√
2
b| ↓〉 ⊗
(
cos (gt/h¯) − sin (gt/h¯)
sin (gt/h¯) cos (gt/h¯)
)
a
(
1
1
)
a
=
=
1√
2
a| ↑〉 ⊗ ((cos (gt/h¯) + sin (gt/h¯)) |U〉+ (cos (gt/h¯)− sin (gt/h¯)) |D〉) +
+
1√
2
b| ↓〉 ⊗ ((cos (gt/h¯)− sin (gt/h¯)) |U〉+ (cos (gt/h¯) + sin (gt/h¯)) |D〉) .
|Ψisa(t1 =
pih¯
4g
)〉 = a| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉+ b| ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉.
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Derivation of (2.6):
Hae = −σ(a)z ⊗
N∑
k=1
gkσ
(e)
z,k
∏
j 6=k
⊗1j.
|Ψi(t1)〉 = (a| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉+ b| ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉)
N∏
k=1
⊗ (αk|u〉k + βk|d〉k) .
|Ψi(t1 ≤ t)〉 =

a exp

i

 N∑
k=1
gkσ
(e)
z,k
∏
j 6=k
⊗1j

 (t− t1)/h¯

 | ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉 +
+b exp

−i

 N∑
k=1
gkσ
(e)
z,k
∏
j 6=k
⊗1j

 (t− t1)/h¯

 | ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉

 N∏
k=1
⊗ (αk|u〉k + βk|d〉k) =
= a| ↑〉 ⊗ |U〉
N∏
k=1
⊗ (αk exp (igk(t− t1)/h¯) |u〉k + βk exp (−igk(t− t1)/h¯) |d〉k) +
+b| ↓〉 ⊗ |D〉
N∏
k=1
⊗ (αk exp (−igk(t− t1)/h¯) |u〉k + βk exp (igk(t− t1)/h¯) |d〉k) .
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